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the benefit of exemptions given residents of the state, it is void as abridging the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and it is not remedied
by allowing the nonresident to deduct from his tax a tax paid on such income in
the state of his residence, if such state allows a like deduction by nonresidents
within its borders; a state cannot barter away the rights of its citizens to the en-
joyment of the privileges and immunities clause, and discrimination cannot be
corrected by retaliation..
JoHN N. HUGHES
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATION
The question whether a fraudulent misrepresentation as to fortune is ground
for annulment of marriage was presented in New York in the recent case of
Shonfeld v. Shonfeld.' Reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals,
by a divided bench (4 to 3), decided that it was error to hold as a matter of law
that the misrepresentation could not be material.
The court, speaking through Crouch, J., based its decision on the New York
statute,2 declaring that "Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, con-
tinues to be a civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of
making a contract is essential," as interpreted in Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo.3 As
the fraud which will invalidate a marriage has never been precisely defined, the
court is left free to meet each case as it arises. It need not necessarily concern
what are commonly called the "essentials" of the marriage relation, but will be
sufficient if it is material to the giving of consent, in the sense that if the mis-
representation had not been made, the consent would not have been given.
The misrepresentation was not a mere exaggeration or misstatement of her means or prospects,
which might or might not be an incentive to marriage. It was a definite statement of an exist-
ing fact without which, as the defendant dearly understood, no marriage was presently
practicable.3
A vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Crane, J., in which the con-
struction of the statute given in the Di Lorenzo case, upon which the court re-
lied, was critically assailed as dictum. A marriage is something more than a
mere civil contract; it results in a status, to which legal rights and liabilities
attach in which the state has an interest. Fraud which will invalidate such a
2s Const., U.S., art. 4, § 2; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 6o (1920); 20 Col.
L. Rev. 457 (1920); z8 Mich. L. Rev. 547 (1920); 29 Yale L. Jour. 799 (1920).
' 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 6o (1933), reversing 258 N.Y. S. 338.
2 C. 14, § io of the New York Cons. Laws (Domestic Relations Law).
3 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92 (1903). See also comments in i Corn. L. Quar.
48 (1916) and 6 Corn L. Quar. 199, 401 (1921).
- Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, x84 N.E. 6o, 62 (1933).
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relation must be serious and important and must be of such a nature as to mis-
lead a reasonably prudent person. But
the marriage in this case was a mere matter of bargain and sale. The woman bought the man
for $6,ooo, and because she failed to have the money the man seeks to have the marriage an-
nulled ..... Sufficient for this case to say that the mere statement of the woman that she
had $6,ooo was not sufficient to deceive a reasonably prudent and careful man, and under the
circumstances stated here is not of sufficient importance to the marriage contract to move a
court of equity to annul it.3b
It has been very generally stated in the reports and textbooks that the
fraud which will invalidate a marriage contract must touch some of the so-called
"essentials" of the marriage relation. A mere misrepresentation as to some of
the "incidentals" of the relation is stated to be insufficient. Such "incidentals"
have been stated to include fortune, rank, character, and health.4 As to fortune
and rank the decisions probably bear out the statement.5 But there has been a
growing tendency to relax the general rule as to character and health, especially
where the complainant was young and inexperienced and the fraudulent mis-
representation or concealment has been particularly gross and would result in a
shocking mismating, as where the defendant was a notorious criminal. 6 An Ala-
bama court decreed an annulment for fraudulent representations as to name,
b Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 26o N. Y. 477, 184 N.E. 6o, 62, 65 (i933).
4 See Madden, Domestic Relations (193), 15; Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (1892),
§ 459; Eversley, Domestic Relations (1926), 29; i8 R.C.L. 414; 38 C. J. 1302. Note Wakefield
v. Mackay, x Phill. Ecc. 134
, 
i Hagg. Consist. 394, where Lord Stowel said, "A man who means
to act upon such representations (character, fortune, or health) should verify them by his own
inquiries. The law presumes that he uses due caution in a matter in which his happiness for
life is so materially involved, and makes no provision for the relief of a blind credulity however
it may have been produced."
sMayer v. Mayer, 207 Cal. 685, 279 Pac. 783 (1929); Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal.
736, 3o Pac. 816, 75 A.L.R. 661 (1931); Williams v. Williams, 32 Del. 39, 118 Atl. 638 (1922);
Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa 107 (1870); Chipman v. Johnston, 237 Mass. 502, i3o N.E. 65, i4 A.L.R.
119 (192i), discussed in ig Mich. L. Rev. 881-82; Heath v. Heath, i59 Atl. 418 (N.H. 193),
disapproving liberal dicta in Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H. 177, io6 AUt. 493 (I919); Woodward v.
Heichelbech, 97 N.J. Eq. 253, 128 Atl. i69 (1925); Jakar v. Jakar, 113 S.C. 295, 102 S.E. 337
(i919), although the defendant was admittedly a "villain of the deepest dye"; and probably
Klein v. Wolfsohn, i Abb. N. Cas. 134 (N.Y. 1876). Contra, Robert v. Robert, i5o N.Y.S.
366 (914); and Raia v. Raia, 214 Ala. 391, io8 So. Ii (1926), where the complainant was very
young and allegedly feeble-minded. For dicta in accordance with the general rule as to fortune
and rank, see Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N.E. 85o (1907); Bielby v. Bielby, 333 Ill. 478,
165 N.E. 235 (1929); Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 At. 144, 22 A.L.R. 8io (1922); Keyes
v. Keyes, 26 N.Y.S. 910 (1893); Fish v. Fish, 39 N.Y.S. 537 (1896); Glean v. Glean, 75 N.Y.S.
622 (1902); Bahrenburg v. Bahrenburg, 15o N.Y.S. 589 (i914); Minner v. Minner, 238 N.Y.
529, 144 N.E. 78r (1924); Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 9ii (930); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 19o (i888). For dicta as to sufficiency of such fraud, see Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H.
177, io6 At. 493 (i919), where the court very caustically assails the argument of public
policy; disapproved in Heath v. Heath, 159 At. 418 (N.H. 1932); Cox v. Cox, iio AU. 924
(N.J.Eq. 1919); Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J.Eq. 588, 146 At. 649 (1929).
6 Brown v. Scott, i4o Md. 258, ii7 AtI. i44, 22 A.L.R. 81o (1922).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
character, and financial ability, where the complainant was very young and al-
legedly feeble-minded. 7
But even in the absence of such special circumstances, some courts have de-
creed an annulment where there has been gross misrepresentation as to char-
acter.' A New York court held a misrepresentation as to honesty sufficient.9
Facts suggesting the existence of a conspiracy to defraud an old man (the com-
plainant) of his property by marriage were held sufficient by the Michigan Su-
preme Court." And annulments have recently been granted in New York for
the false representation of the defendant that he loved the complainant and had
money where his purpose ih getting married was to evade the immigration
laws," and for a misrepresentation as to citizenship where it resulted in the ex-
patriation of the complainant."
The early New York cases, supported by several recent decisions and numer-
ous dicta, were generally to the effect that marriage is something more than a
contract; it is a status. 3
But the conception of marriage as predominantly contractual was developed
in i9o3 when the New York Court of Appeals decided Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo.4
It is upon the authority of this case that the Shonfeld case is decided, as
well as many of the other New York cases to be considered. It is the argument
of the dissenting justices that this statement in the Di Lorenzo case is dictum
and therefore not binding on the New York Court of Appeals. But is it? It is
submitted that the fraud in the Di Lorenzo case (representation to the com-
plainant that the child shown him by the defendant was theirs when in fact the
7 Raia v. Raia, 214 Ala. 391, Io8 So. ii (1926).
8 Dooley v. Dooley, 93 N.J.Eq. 22, iiS At. 136 (1921); contra, XVier v. Still, 31 Iowa 107
(1870).
9 Sheridan v. Sheridan, i86 N.Y.S. 470 (1921).
10 Gillett v. Gillett, 78 Mich. 184, 43 N.W. iioi (i889) (a very incomplete report).
11 Rubman v. Rubman, 251 N.Y.S. 474 (1931) (excellent survey of cases).
12Truiano v. Truiano, 201 N.Y.S. 573 (1923), discussed in 24 Col. L. Rev. 433, 8 Minn. L.
Rev. 341, and 33 Yale L. Jour. 793 (1924).
13 Fish v. Fish, 39 N.Y.S. 537 (1896); Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N.Y. 54, 70 N.E. 120 (1904);
Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, i44 N.Y.S. 774 (ii3); Miner v. Miner,'238 N.Y. 529, 144 N.E. 781
(924); and see Lapides v. Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, x71 N.E. 911 (1930) for approval of this
"status" theory of marriage.
'4 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92 (i9o3) where the court said
While, then, it is true that marriage contracts are based upon consideration peculiar to
themselves and that public policy is concerned with the regulation of the family relation,
nevertheless, our law considers the marriage in no other light than as a civil contract .....
There is no valid reason for excepting marriage contracts from the general rule (of contracts).
.... If the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that through a misrepresentation
of some fact, which was an essential element in the giving of his consent to the contract of
marriage and which was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, he has
been victimized, the court is empowered to annul the marriage.
It is to be observed that the New York courts have not carried the contractual concept of
marriage to its logical extreme of permitting the parties mutually to rescind or abandon the
contract.
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defendant had given birth to no child at all) would not be sufficient ground for
the annulment of the marriage in most jurisdictions. That fraud did not go to
any of the so-called "essentials" of the marriage. But it was a material induce-
ment (i.e., saving the honor of the defendant, legitimating the child, etc.) to the
complainant's consenting to the marriage. It may be that the construction of
the statute given by the Court of Appeals in that case was questionable, as the
court has repeatedly admitted, since and lastly in the Shonfeld case, that the
statute was merely declaratory of the existing law; and it would seem that such
a fraud would be insufficient before."5 But in deciding the Di Lorenzo case as it
did it was necessary for the Court of Appeals to make such a broad statement as
to the contractual nature of marriage. And it has been repeatedly followed in
New York. 6
The cases cited by Judge Crouch in his opinion do fully bear out his conclu-
sion that the fraud need not necessarily go to the essentials of the marriage. 7
And in 1914 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court decreed an
annulment where the complainant was induced to marry the defendant by his
misrepresentation that they would put their money together and buy a hotel,
and it appeared that the defendant had never any intention of carrying out his
declared intention. 8
It is thus seen that the decision in the Shonfeld case is not at all revolutionary
in New York, that substantially identical facts were held ground for annulment
almost two decades ago, that it is a logical result of the principles announced in
Is Klein v. Wolfsohn, i Abb. N. Cas. x34 (1876). Note the construction given to similar
statutes as merely declaratory in Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124 (i89i); Willets v. Willets, 76
Neb. 228 (igo6); Thorne v. Farrar, 57 Wash. 44i (igio); Wells v. Talham, x8o Wis. 654, 194
N.W. 36, 33 A.L.R. 827 (1923).
x6See Domschke v. Domschke, 122 N.Y.S. 892 (igio); Robert v. Robert, i5o N.Y.S. 366
(x914); Griffin v. Griffin, 204 N.Y.S. 131, aff'd in 2o5 N.Y.S. 926 (I924); Rutstein v. Rutstein,
222 N.Y.S. 688 (1927); Beard v. Beard, 238 N.Y. 599, 144 N.E. 9o8 (1924), aff'g. 20i N.Y.S.
886 (1924). See further the cases cited in Crouch, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud in New
York, 6 Corn. L. Quar. 4o (1921). Judge Crouch says, at p. 4o5,
It wiped out any limitation of the field of materiality which, for considerations of public
policy, had been confined to facts going to the essence of the marriage relation. It applied to
the marriage contract the rule applicable to all other contracts that the misrepresentation of
any material fact, including consent, justifies rescission ..... Public policy does not enter
into the matter ..... The court, deliberately as it seems, excluded its consideration. At the
very outset of its opinion it stamped as error the holding of the Appellate Division that con-
siderations of public policy took the marriage relation so far out of the domain of ordinary
contracts as not to warrant annulment. While it recognized that public policy is concerned
with the regulation of the family relation, "Nevertheless," it said, "our law considers marriage
in no other light than as a civil contract"; and hence that there was no valid reason for except-
ing the marriage contract from the general rule. When the cases in this and other states holding
the older doctrine were pressed to the attention of the court, it put them aside without attempt
at explanation or differentiation and, relying upon the plain provisions of our statute and the
established rules applicable to contracts generally, laid down the rule quoted above.
'7 Domschke v. Domschke, 122 N.Y.S. 892 (i9IO); contra Glean v. Glean, 75 N.Y.S. 622
(1902).
is Robert v. Robert, x5o N.Y.S. 366 (1914).
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the Di Lorenzo case, and that it is probably in line with the changed social atti-
tudes toward marriage. 9
A factor of undoubted significance in the development of this liberal attitude
of the New York courts toward annulment is the restriction of absolute divorce
to only one ground, namely, adultery.20
With this decision, the New York Court of Appeals seems to have definitely
accepted the logical result of the Di Lorenzo case; and there seems to be consid-
erable reason and justification for the decision, in view of the statutory situa-
tion. But it can well be doubted whether the courts of other jurisdictions will
follow, unless they should become convinced that there is less "public policy" in
denying relief where the domestic difficulties have already been aired in court
than in granting it at the request of the parties, where divorce is difficult or un-
desirable.
CLIFFORD J. HYNNING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT
Proponents of the declaratory judgment as a necessary procedural reform'
may well be heartened by a recent decision' handed down by the United States
Supreme Court. After a steady march of approval through numerous state
courts, 3 the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment as a "case" or "con-
troversy" received a set back at the hands of our highest tribunal in a number
19 See Ogbum, The Changing Family, 23 Pub. Am. Sociological Soc., 124-133 (1928), re-
printed in Reuter and Runner, The Family (x931), i5o-i56. Also see Recent Social Trends
(1933), 661-708. Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 497, says,
at page 517,
The mores of the day are not the same as of a hundred years ago. People look upon the
marriage relation differently. This point is evident at every point in the marriage relation. It
is submitted that a judicious application of the liberal view of the New York courts is in
harmony with present day social attitudes, and that the law cannot hope to modify social
concepts but will eventually itself be modified thereby as the present trend rather definitely
shows.
See Wells v. Talham, i8o Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36, 33 A.L.R. 827 (1923), suggesting this
explanation.
I Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 Col. L. Rev. 56i (1931),
The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 Yale L. Jour. r, io 5 (1918),
The Declaratory Judgment in the United States, 37 W.Va. L. Rev. 127 (1931), Judicial Relief
for Peril and Insecurity, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 793 (1932); Cooper, Locking the Stable Door Before
The Horse Is Stolen, i6 Ill. L. Rev. 436 (1921); Dodd, Progress of Preventive Justice, 6 Am.
Bar Ass'n. Jour. r5i (1920); Rice, The Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment, 28 W.
Va. L. Rev. i (1921); Sunderland, Modem Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory
Judgment, i6 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (1917).
2 Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway v. Ray C. Wallace, Comptroller of the
Treasury of Tennessee, etc., 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (i933).
3 For a complete tabulation of states and decisions therein, see Borchard, The Constitu-
tionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 Col. L. Rev. 56i, notes 3 and 4 (i93i).
